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Introduction
It is only about five years since the 'newly
industrialising countries' (NICs) became widely
identified as a distinct focus of attention, both in trade
policy and as a category of developing countries of
interest in itself [OECD 1979; FCO 1979].' A large
amount of literature on the subject is starting to pile up
on the shelves. What one might call the orthodox
mainstream has adopted a 'mutual interests' approach,
arguing that the rapid growth of manufactured
exports by the NICs is on balance modest but positive
in its impact both on competing advanced industrial
countries (AICs) and on the NICs themselves
[OECD 1979; Cable 1979, 1983; Turner and McMullen
1982].
There have, however, been dissenting voices. One
group has questioned the developmental benefits of
'dependent' industrialisation [Froebel et al 1980].
Another has tried to give intellectual flesh to the bare
bones of prejudice against 'cheap labour' competition
from Asia, seeking to establish that Europe in
particular is seriously 'threatened' by an alien,
'supercompetitive' system of economic organisation
[Hager 1982; Stoffaies 1979]. Another does not
dispute the benefits that have occurred in the past but
warns against extrapolating forward and, in particular,
against a 'fallacy of composition' in assuming that all
ldcs could follow in the footsteps of the NICs
[Cime 1982].2
The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is
descriptive, to summarise roughly where the NICs
now stand in world trade; the second is more
ambitious, to try to advance the arguments in respect
of the effect of import competition on employment,
output and prices in the AICs.
Recent Trends in Policy
It is extremely difficult to monitor the overall trend in
the use of protective instruments. But the attempts to
'Definitions vary but the list used by the OECD includes the following:
Brazil, Mexico, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Hong Kong.
Taiwan, Korea and Singapore. A wider definition would take in
countries such as India, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines,
Argentina, Colombia. A narrower one would remove the Southern
European countries.
'For the contrasting 'optimistic' view see: [Hughes 1981].
Bu/blm, 1983. vol 14 'o 3. Inslitutv of Dcvelopusel Stud/cs, Susses
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quantify the share of 'managed trade' [Page 1980],
simple enumeration of barriers and the judgements of
GATT suggest the following:
First there was an upsurge in protection in the period
1976-78 which was directed substantially at NICs.
This subsequently reached a plateau but may now
have resumed. It needs to be remembered that overall
trade policy towards the NICs and other ldcs is still
heavily influenced by what happens in textiles and
clothing. It can be seen from Table 1 that the level of
market penetration by ldcs ís significantly higher in
this sector than in others and, despite the MFA
restrictions was, in the 1970s, one of the most buoyant.
Since 1977, textile restrictions have increased sharply
in severity and the new generation of negotiated
agreements - to run from 1982 for the EEC - is
stiffer still. The severity of controls does, however,
depend very much on the small print: flexibility
provisions and 'safeguard' mechanisms of various
kinds. It would be surprising if the growth in exports
of textiles and clothing from NICs (or Ides in general)
to AICs were mich to exceed 2 to 3 per cent pa in real
terms in the future; far below past growth, and
expectations. Current trade conflicts do, however,
increasingly take place in those areas into which the
more advanced NICs have moved: consumer electrics,
steel and, ominously, vehicles.
Second arguments about protectionism have shifted
to inter-AIC trade. Problems are both sectoral (steel,
consumer electrics, cars, chemicals, farming) and
across-the-board (European and US reaction to the
Japanese trade surplus). It is too early to predict what
will result from the protectionist sentiment in the US
congress, which favours strong US measures against
both the EEC and Japan. Inter-AIC competition is
also taking other protectionist forms not involving
imports, such as the spread of 'mixed credit' - the
Aid-Trade Provision (ATP) in the UK - and the use
of subsidies to 'dump' agricultural surpluses. As long
as the recession continues it is difficult to see any
lessening in the pressures for trade restrictions.
Third the pressure is not all in one direction. The
Tokyo Round negotiations have left a legacy of
modest liberalisation provisions which are now slowly
Table 1
Share of imports in the apparent consumption of manufactured goods in industrial countries by
major product groups 1970-79
(%)
Source: World Bank Import Penetration Proejct.
and quietly grinding their way to realisation: modest
tariff cuts; opening up of government procurement to
international tender; standards unification. The
virtual failure of the November 1982 inter-ministerial
meeting has, however, cast grave doubts over the
extent to which GATT rules and procedures will
survive. There have also been important changes in the
political context. The advent of the Reagan and
Thatcher governments and the loss of influence of the
'labour movement' in these and other countries have
contributed to an increase in 'free trade' rhetoric.
There is clearly a gap between rhetoric and practice
because of the influence of business pressure groups
and examples of this abound: the 'weasel words' in
Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative regarding textiles
and sugar; the 'hawkish' role played by the British
Government in textile negotiations, at the GATT
inter-ministerial and over every import that could be
classified as 'unfair'. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied
that the current dominance of the political 'Right' has
acted as a force against protectionism, whether
directed at NICs or trade in general.
Developments in the NICs
The popular picture conjured up in the late l970s of
the NICs as a homogenous group of countries all
annual average
growth of
import shares
heading for Japanese-style miracles now looks rather
different. It always has been very misleading to lump
together the 'city states' of Hong Kong and Singapore
(themselves very different in their approach to
economic management) and the much larger Korea
and Taiwan. Nevertheless as a group they have
dominated ldcs' exports of manufactures, and all have
a record of sustained export and economic growth (see
Table 2) which has held up remarkably well in the face
of recession. ASEAN countries - Malaysia and
Thailand especially - are beginning to show signs of a
similar capacity. But there is a different picture
elsewhere.
First there has been a near-collapse of Eastern
European NIC attempts to grow rapidly with Western
technology imports and credit paid for by 'counter
trade' exports. What will now happen to all those
Polish shoes and machine tools? There is pressure
from Western creditors to make the Eastern bloc
export more to service its debt, but the supply
problems of Eastern Europe are extremely serious.
There has also been a substantial downward
reappraisal of Chinese capacity as manufacturing
importer and exporter (though China was able to use
its market as a 'lever' in textiles negotiations with the
USA).
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'SIC
code product group 1970 1980 1970-80
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 8.6 3.0 11.1 3.7 2.3 11.5
32 Clothing, textiles and
leather 11.6 2.7 25.1 10.5 7.5 13.1
33 Wood products 9.5 1.8 15.6 3.6 4.9 7.1
34 Paper and printing 6.6 0.1 10.2 0.5 3.1 11.9
35 Chemicals 10.6 2.0 16.1 3.8 3.1 5.7
36 Non-metallic minerals 5.9 0.3 9.9 1.1 4.8 13.8
37 Metals 15.0 3.2 21.2 4.1 2.4 2.1
38 Machinery 11.3 0.3 22.0 2.1 5.5 17.6
3 Manufacturing 10.6 1.7 17.9 3.4 4.3 6.8
developing developing developing
all country all country all country
imports imports imports imports imports imports
Second there has been a different response to post
1974 oil crises by different NICs. Some, notably Brazil
and Mexico, allowed exchange rates to become
overvalued in contrast to the more successful Korea
and Taiwan [Balassa 1980]. The Far Eastern NICs
appear more generally to have weathered the era of
slower growth and protection much better than the
Latin Americans. It may be, however, that the policies
now being forced onto the latter group by their
indebtedness problems and by the IMF will
significantly raise their competitiveness in years to
come.
There is also a divergence emerging between capitalist
ldcs giving priority to international monetarist ideas
- internal price stabilisation with exchange appre-
ciation (the UK/Chile 'models') - and 'old-fashioned'
export based growth policies using devaluation and
equivalent incentives (the Korea/Japan 'model'). To
put the point in another way, the contradictions
between 'monetarist' and 'supply side' prescriptions
are having ramifications for NIC policy. Eventually
the approaches may be reconciled but the immediate
effect is to widen the distance between the more
successful manufacturing exporters and some possible
emulators.
Table 2
Market penetration by region of origin
(%)
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Note: t) Spain, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Israel
Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea
includes Caribbean
includes China and other communist ldcs
7) Eastern Europe less Yugoslavia
Source; World Bank Import Penetration Project
Third debt and payments problems have forced
more and more ldcs to look to IMF and/or the World
Bank for funds and they have thereby accepted greater
external policy supervision. Although policy pre-
scriptions vary both between the Bank and Fund, and
between borrowers, there is evidence of influence
being extended to get ldcs to adopt 'sound' trade
policies, that is, neutrality between exports and import
substitutes, and adjustment of exchange rates to
maintain external equilibrium with fewer controls. An
important example is the role of the IMF in India,
where it has edged a sceptical government towards
import liberalisation and export promotion. A few of
the newcomers are already making an impact on world
markets (Table 4). Thus, although there may be some
backsliding and some NICs seem likely to drop out of
the picture (mainly those in Eastern Europe) the
general situation in the late 1980s will be characterised
by the existing NICs becoming more open and
competitive and by more ldcs becoming NICs.
The Economics of Protection and
Liberalisation
The impact of the NICs on the AICs begins to
resemble a collision between an unstoppable force and
share of imports of
manufactures to industrial
countries
annual average growth
of the share of
imports
1970 1980 1970-80
1) Southern Europe 2.0 3.0 3.2
2) Far Eastern NIC exporters 2.3 4.9 8.0
3) Latin America 5.2 5.2 0.4
4) Other developing countries 6.0 6.0 0.3
5) Total developing countries (countries l-4) 15.5 19.1 2.4
6) All industrial countries 82.4 78.3 -0.6
7) Centrally-planned economies 2.1 2.6 2.5
'Excluding Greece which joined the European Community in 1981
Source: World Bank Import Penetration Project
an immovable object. The unstoppable force we have
described briefly. The immovable object is represented
by levels of unemployment and depressed business
profits in industrial countries which are now much
worse and apparently more permanent than in the late
1970s. What should the AICs do? How do the
arguments for and against protection stand up in
present circumstances? The conventional (but not very
helpful) wisdom is that protection is both a cause and
effect of unemployment: a cause because it makes for a
more difficult trade-off between inflation and
unemployment; an effect for obvious political reasons.
The traditional partial equilibrium analysis of costs
and benefits is not really appropriate in conditions of
general disequilibrium. An attempt has been made by
the author and Martin Weale to use the Cambridge
growth model to analyse for the UK two cases of
sectoral protection of interest or potential interest to
NICs (textiles/clothing; vehicles) [Cable l982a,
1982b]. The assumptions made in the exercise are
necessarily over-simplified to conform to the specifi-
cations of the model. For example it was necessary to
look at the implications of restraining all imports
rather than those of NICs in isolation.
We have assumed that the basic aim of the AIC
government (Britain in this case) would be to prevent
share in apparent consumption of growth of import shares
further import penetration in major industries. For
every 1 per cent increase in income, British people
choose to increase their spending on manufactured
imports by somewhat more than 1 per cent. So a policy
of halting market penetration would require high and
rising levels of protection. We estimate on the basis of
assumptions spelt out in Table 5 that in one case
(clothing) the tariff equivalent of additional controls
on all imports would need to be 43 per cent in 1985
increasing to 55 per cent in 1990. For vehicles the
figures are 67 per cent and 150 per cent respectively.
The textiles and clothing industry figures are the lower
of the two since there is already quota restraint on 'low
cost' imports; the tariffs and quota premia paid in the
EEC on imports from the Far East often amount,
already, to the equivalent of an import duty of over 50
per cent.
The model was used to compare a 'base run' forecast
with one incorporating tariffs or quotas, and to
analyse the difference. The analysis looks ahead to
1990 to capture some of the cumulative and 'dynamic'
effects. It assumed that the government would allow
the exchange rate to float, and seek to maintain a
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) target.
Hence, in the model, the exchange rate and tax rates
were adjusted to maintain external (current account)
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developing-
all country
imports imports
1970
developing-
all country
imports imports
1980
developing-
all country
imports imports
1970-80
Australia 20.8 2.1 26.0 5.5 2.6 11.0
Canada 26.1 1.2 31.6 2.1 1.8 5.1
European Community (of nine)1 18.9 2.7 32.6 4.6 4.9 5.7
Belgium 61.7 5.6 84.6 6.7 3.4 2.0
France 12.1 2.1 23.2 3.8 3.7 7.8
West Germany 19.3 2.2 31.2 4.8 5.0 8.2
Italy 15.1 2.1 31.7 5.2 6.9 9.4
Netherlands 41.2 4.9 62.2 7.5 2.1 6.9
United Kingdom 16.3 3.3 28.2 3.5 6.0 -0.3
Japan 4.5 1.3 6.3 2.5 2.4 5.8
Sweden 31.0 2.8 38.0 3.8 2.5 3.9
United States 5.4 1.2 8.7 2.9 4.6 8.6
Total of above industrial countries 10.6 1.7 17.9 3.4 4.3 6.8
and internal balance. In this way we tried to view the
issue of import controls as seen through the eyes of
present day ministers and not as part of some
reflationary 'alternative strategy'.
The application of tariffs shows that what may be
good for the protected industry may not be good for
the economy as a whole (Tables 6, 7). For textiles,
protection boosts output and employment in the
industry, but in the economy at large output falls, as
does personal disposable income, while there are
70,000 'lost' jobs elsewhere to set aside the industry's
'gain' of 110,000 jobs. Tariffs, by cutting imports,
push up the exchange rate, so hitting the production of
other traded goods and services. In the case of vehicles
there are apparently more favourable results (other
than a 2 per cent addition to overall consumer prices)
because the import restricting effect is swamped by
others. For example the import duties collected are so
Table 4
Manufactured exports of second-tier developing countries 1970-79
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I Exports to OECD only.
2 Fuel exports excluded from total exports: Indonesia 8 per cent, Malaysia 21 per cent.
large as to permit a lop in the £ cut in income tax with
large consequential expenditure effects (including
more spent on other imports).
In the real world large, unilateral and increasing
tariffs, at least of this magnitude, are not feasible.
More likely are 'voluntary export restrictions' (VERs)
of the type already applied to 'low cost' textiles
imports, Japanese cars, Far Eastern TVs and sundry
other items. Exporters are, in effect, bribed not to
export by giving them the scarcity premium which
accrues from quota control. The importing country
cedes a terms of trade loss in order to protect one of its
industries. In the more extreme case (vehicles) this is so
large as to lead to a big increase in the value of vehicle
imports while the volume is cut. In general, the terms
of trade loss is paid for in higher inflation and reduced
personal disposable income. The effects on national
employment and output seem more favourable than
total manufactured exports
$ million
1970 1979
manufactures as share of total exports
per cent
1970 1979
Chile 5° 650 4 32
Cyprus 5 227 5 50
Haiti 9 203 22 56
Indonesia 12 448 32
Jordan 11 157 32 39
Malaysia 151 1,947 7 182
Malta 23 368 79 87
Mauritius' 101 27
Morocco 47 460 10 23
Peru 12 400 Il
Philippines 78 991 7 22
Sri Lanka' 5 132 2 25
Thailand 39 1,213 5 23
Tunisia 36 604 20 34
Uruguay 56 374 24 48
TOTAL 571 8,645 7 17
82 202
non NICs 6,364 61,761 53 67
552 732
other developing 11 8
countries 4,191 21,637 212 332
Table 5
Assumptions employed in calculations 1980-90
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
with tariffs except that the gains are due to the
consequent devaluation which maintains external
balance, and the same devaluation, on its own, gives
better results.
We have assumed hitherto that, although imports are
made more expensive, British producers do not
respond by pushing up their prices in a more protected
market to enlarge their profit margins. The same
optimistic assumption underlies the advocacy of
Effects of import restrictions on textiles and clothing 1990
(% change from standard run unless specified)
import controls by the Cambridge Economic Policy
Group and is critical to the argument since a more
orthodox market economy view of pricing - the 'law
of one price' - would indicate much stronger
inflationary effects from protection. An intermediate
case was investigated in which the same tariff is
applied but costs and import prices are given equal
weight in price formation. Export prices are also
partly set with reference to home prices so there is a
loss of overseas competitiveness and exports, as well as
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tariff VERs QRs given
to
companies
tariff when
home prices
rise
Real personal disposable income negl. -0.7 -1.6 -0.7
Real GDP -0.4 +0.2 -2.5 -0.9
Consumer prices (all) +0.3 +1.5 +1.4 +1.9
Employment in textiles ('000) +110 + 125 +78 -34
Employment in rest of UK economy
('000) -70 +10 -274 -78
Terms of trade +1.0 -1.6 +3.9 +1.6
Exchange rate to maintain external
balance +2.7 - +9.6 +2.7
Income tax rate to maintain constant
PSBR' (p in the L) -0.3 +0.3 +4.4 -0.7
before import
controls
after import
controls
% %
Real annual growth of imports of vehicles (including components) 11.5 4.5
Real annual growth of imports of textiles and clothing 6.1 1.8
Tariff required to produce the restraint levels (per cent) 1985 1990
textiles 21 32
clothing 43 55
vehicles 67 150
Table 6
greater import competition. The output and employ-
ment 'gains' from tariff protection are substantially
reduced in the case of cars and reversed in the case of
textiles, in the latter case costing 100,000 British jobs
overall.
The exercise assumed initially that workers do not act
to restore real wage levels if these are affected by
protection. However, a case was investigated in which
workers negotiate to maintain a target real wage
(Table 8). The main effects in the case considered are
to make tradeable goods and services less inter-
nationally competitive, thus reducing exports, output
and employment. This underlines the need for
protection (like devaluation) to be accompanied by
wage controls if it is to be effective.
When imports are restricted, someone, somewhere,
makes a windfall profit from their relative scarcity. It
could be overseas exporters in the case ofVERs or the
British Government (via tariffs or auctioned import
quotas). Import quotas administered in Britain could
be variously designed to benefit government,
importers or manufacturers. Who receives the
windfall gain, and how they spend it, is crucial to the
economics of the exercise. A case was investigated
where the windfall accrues to UK private distributors
or manufacturers. The company sector saves a much
higher percentage of additional income than would
private consumers or government. The effects of this
difference are quite dramatic. The result of a transfer
from consumers to companies is that imports fall, the
Table 7
Effects of import restrictions on vehicles
(% change unless specified)
'Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
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exchange rate appreciates and we end up with reduced
prices and higher unemployment.
The conclusions so far do not depend upon the
overseas exporting country maintaining some sort of
balance or reciprocity in its trade relations with AICs.
The UK Government appears to believe, however,
that by selectively punishing those NICs which
maintain high tariffs, like Brazil, it will open up these
markets for British exporters. This is a bizarre theory
since most of the countries concerned (Japan is in a
different category) have large external payments
deficits and extreme debt problems, and cannot be
accused of a reluctance to import, whatever other
charge is levelled at them. And some governments may
take vigorous exception to any unilateral action by
Brstain, as several exporters to Indonesia can testify
painfully. However these are judgements which
cannot be quantified, as indeed neither can the wider
economic costs of frustrating newly industrialising
and other developing countries' efforts to break into
world markets for industrial goods.
The broad conclusions are as follows. By using a
national economic model it is possible to highlight the
difference between sectional and national interests in
the protection argument. The gain in output and
employment accruing from selective protection of one
industry will be offset in part or total by employment
and output losses elsewhere in the economy. However,
the national economic effects of sectoral protection
vary as between industries and according to the
tariff VERs lar(ff when
home prices rise
QRs given to
companies
Real personal disposable income +4.2 +1.2 +2.6 -1.6
Real GDP +2.5 +5.4 +0.7 -3.8
Consumer prices +1.9 +6.0 +3.7 -4.1
Employment in vehicles ('000) +100 +116 +11 +65
Employment in rest of UK economy
('000) +343 +716 +174 -400
Terms of trade -0.4 -10.6 -0.7 +7.7
Exchange rate to maintain external
balance -1.3 -13.0 +1.3 +20.8
Income tax rate to maintain constant
PSBR' (p in the L) -11.0 -6.0 -11.0 +6.5
techniques of protection used. In terms of the effects
on real personal disposable income, greater protection
of textiles and clothing has little to commend it on any
assumption, and even the claim that it saves jobs is
dubious. By contrast the motor vehicles industry gives
more favourable results though these depend
precariously on the assumptions made about pricing,
wage behaviour and the use of quota premia. Bearing
in mind the major qualifications made, the policy
implication is that, faced with the unstoppable force,
the immovable object should certainly try to move;
that is, it should adjust to its trading comparative
advantage.
Where do we go next?
While the issue of protection and trade liberalisat ion
can be confronted academically in terms of overall
costs and benefits, policy formation is institutionally
bound and reflects preoccupations which do not have
a strong economic rationale such as 'reciprocity',
'fairness' and geopolitical interests. The following is a
brief summary of where we now stand on negotiating
issues of critical importance to NICs and ldcs in
general.
The textiles Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA) has
been renewed until 1987 and bilateral agreements
within it are largely complete. The extension, like
previous extensions, has been rationalised in terms of
short run political and social considerations. But what
is the long term future of the textile and clothing
industries in AICs? The revised MFA is more explicit
than its predecessors about the need for 'adjustment',
but this may be just rhetoric.
Tariffs are not an entirely dormant issue; Tokyo
Round signatories will have to approve the second
stage of cuts to run from 1984/85. Ldcs continue,
through UNCTAD, to invest hopes in the GSP (tariff
Table 8
'In this case we did flot attempt to bring about external and internal balance.
preferences) despite all the evidence that this is largely
an unimportant side-show.
The US made a major issue of services
liberalisation at the GATT inter-ministerial meeting
but so far little progress has been made. There are
interesting and unfamiliar problems such as access to
'telematics'; banking regulations; and the link between
trade and investment, as in tourism and insurance.
Ldcs have an opportunity in the long term to develop
services exports, but have so far adopted a negative
approach to negotiations, fearing for their 'infant'
industries in insurance and banking, and suspecting
that freer trade in services is a first step to looser
controls on MNCs.
Safeguards for manufacturers: this issue has
remained unresolved since the Tokyo Round. The
argument is over whether the EEC is willing to give up
some freedom to demand negotiated quota restraints
in return for some acceptance by NICs/Japan that
'selective' import quota measures can be taken (ie
against them on a discriminatory basis). GATT is
eager to introduce some order and discipline in this
area, with a more realistic code of conduct for
safeguard action. But the EEC prefers its present
freedom to use VERs or unilaterally imposed quotas
as a means of dealing with the 'threat' from NICs in
particular products.
y) 'Graduation' procedures: UNCTAD seems to be
digging in its heels against 'graduation' by NICs; that
is, against moves towards greater 'reciprocity' and
away from a strict interpretation of 'special and
differential' treatment for ldcs. However, reciprocity
is occurring anyway and it is simply no longer a
sustainable position that Korea and Brazil should be
treated on the same basis as Sri Lanka or Kenya. NIC
governments (especially Korea and Brazil) have to
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Effects of treating wages endogenously: textile tariffs
(difference from exogenous wage case)
(% change unless stated)
Real PDI negl
Real GDP 0.7
Employment ('000) 206
Prices +2.3
Terms of Trade +1.0
Exchange Rate'
Economic Tax Rate (p in the L)' +0.7
Balance of payments (L bn at constant 1975 prices)' 3.5
PSBR (L bn)' +8
consider what advantages they will get by calling the
bluff of Western business and governments, who
complain about their high trade barriers, and offering
reciprocal liberalisation. Some NICs are liberalising
unilaterally but the complainants seem not to have
noticed, or to be giving them credit for it. The balance
of payments of some NICs, eg Brazil and Mexico are a
more immediate constraint.
vi) Japan: the NICs are indirectly affected by the
trade conflict between Japan and the EEC and US. A
spread of product restrictions on Japanese exports will
probably create precedents for restrictions on the
NICs (eg consumer electronics) to the extent that one
is needed. On the other hand, if Japan can be
persuaded to use its balance of payments surplus to
pursue some expansionary policies and open up its
home market (or even give more aid) then NICs (and
other ldcs) may be helped.
Global Talks
It is possible that after the inconclusive GATT inter-
ministerial meeting a new round of international
negotiations on trade liberalisation could be launched
to resolve outstanding problems on inter AIC trade
such as agriculture, to further the hesitant progress
made on non-tariff codes, and to look afresh at the ldc
and NIC issues which were overlooked, or by-passed,
in the Tokyo Round. Given the high ideological
profile accorded to 'free trade' by the main Western
governments, global negotiations on liberalisation
might seem propitious; but as the GATT talks
demonstrated, negative political pressures on them are
also great. There is little sign that the EEC, in
particular, is interested in anything more ambitious
than achieving a (low) lowest common denominator
of its 10 national interests. The US administration is
fighting a rear-guard action against protectionists in
Congress, and is trying to head off damaging conflict
with the EEC, and with Japan. In these circumstances,
the prospects of NICs and other ldcs being given
sympathetic consideration in global negotiations are
remote.
Is there the prospect of regional initiatives? There is
already a degree of implicit regionalism in trade and in
trade policy. The attempt of the EEC to assimilate
Mediterranean NICs through accession or association
is one example, as are US sensitivity to Mexican/Car-
ibbean interests, and Japanese involvement in Pacific
basin NICs. A failure to resolve issues globally may
lead to greater emphasis on this approach. And the
EEC might, realistically, be expected to cope better
with the centre-periphery problem of freer trade with
Mediterranean NICs rather than with NICs as a
whole. But the philosophy is fundamentally anachro-
nistic: trade no longer flows in neat geopolitical, let
40
alone colonial, channels; communications and trans-
port cost reductions have eliminated most of the
advantages of proximity.
Signs of Hope?
In current circumstances it is easy to counsel
pessimism in trade policy. An extrapolation into the
l980s of the manufacturing export growth rates
achieved by ldcs in the 1960s would certainly lead
rapidly to disillusionment, and to a good deal of excess
capacity in ldc export industries. There is, however, a
danger of over-reaction; of coming to regard
'protectionism' as an impossible barrier rather than,
as it is, a patchy network of partial controls. Statistical
evidence, at least up to the recent past, shows that the
NICs continue to grow relatively rapidly, that ldcs
diversifying into manufactured exports are achieving
substantial growth in these items, and that AICs are
continuing to cede market penetration. Several poor
countries (some members of the ASEAN group and
China) have shown a willingness to retaliate against
trade restrictions and achieve concessions thereby.
There are important interest groups in AICs resisting
the pressures of protectionism. The immovable object
not only ought to move; it probably will, slowly.
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